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There are few scholars today who are challenging the 
notion "nothing is objectively right or wrong because 
nothing objectively matters," one such scholar is 
Thomas Nagel; we will pursue in this essay a keener 
understanding of the possibilities of ethical objectivity in 
the face of the popularity of the position mentioned 
above (often understood as "nihilism"). We will attempt 
to articulate Nagel's alternative, a "view from nowhere," 
as a way out of the rather relativistic and reductionistic 
tendencies of moral philosophies today. 
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Introduction: The Quest for Objective Understanding 
 
 It has been a century and a half after the demise of the 
philosopher dubbed as one of the great founding fathers of 
existentialist thought--it was Søren Kieerkegaard (1813-1855) who 
became the very exemplar of a mode of philosophy that dared to 
defend the “subjectivity” of man in the face of a modern, highly-
technological, mechanistic world, a world that threatens to 
dehumanize the human subject, transforming him from being a 
legitimate center of meaning into a mere thing that can be 
manipulated, exploited, controlled, driven into calculative thinking. 
Existential phenomenology gave us good reason to suppose that 
our personhood is something inexhaustibly profound and 
irreducible to “cog in the machine,” or “a jar of chemicals,” a living 
human being is much more than just a mass of bones, tissues and 
cells—we are, after, all embodied subjects. However, we also realize 
that we are bodies, we conduct scientific procedures on ourselves as 
bodies whenever we treat bodily ailments and diseases; it is also true 
that brain activity is partially explained by the movement of 
electrical signals to and from the brain. Science demands us to be 
objective about what we know concerning ourselves and reality, and 
we conduct investigations and experiments that somehow would be 
methodical and would have a high degree of repeatability; science 
endeavors to conceive of knowledge about the world. In similar 
fashion, ethics demands objectivity with regard to reasons for doing 
what we ought to do. 
Thomas Nagel (1937--) woke up to this intellectual climate 
when the so-called tension between subjectivity and objectivity is 
already in place. In the opening pages of his masterful work The 
View From Nowhere he addresses the problem of reconciling the 
subjective standpoint with the objective standpoint, but rather than 
aiming at complete unification (which he thought could occur 
occasionally but not always), he is quick to point out the often 
ignored intuitiveness drawn from the juxtaposition itself, the 
interplay of these two conceptions: “I find it natural to regard life 
and the world this way—and that includes conflicts between the 
standpoints and the discomfort caused by obstacles to their 
integration. Certain forms of perplexity—for example, about 
freedom, knowledge and the meaning of life—seem to me to 
embody more insight than any of the supposed solutions to those 
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problems.”1 The tension itself is quite useful and we draw 
conceptions that will prove worthwhile, especially when it comes to 
knowing ourselves. 
Science and reason have for the longest time been 
demanding that we undertake the objective method of 
understanding. Traditional academic inquiry suggests that objective 
understanding, often grounded on justified belief in accordance to 
available evidence, is to differentiated from subjectivity which 
casually refers to raw, visceral, even “unargued or unjustified 
personal feelings and opinions.”2 Drawing from this definition, it 
becomes impossible to create reconciliation, let alone a kind of 
back-and-forth interaction between objective and subjective, leaving 
us empty-handed. But Nagel endeavors to clarify further what he 
means by objective and subjective standpoints, which appear to be 
modified from the traditional meaning, and there is value in the 
tension itself: “To acquire a more objective understanding of some 
aspect of life or the world, we step back from our initial view of it 
and form a new conception which has that view in its relation to the 
world as its object…we place ourselves in the world that is to be 
understood [even if] the [initial] view [will come] to be regarded as 
an appearance… subjective…and correctable and confirmable by 
reference to it.”3 There are occasions, however, when the subjective 
standpoint cannot be subordinated, and as Nagel heeds the 
warnings of Nietzsche, we often wonder why it is easier for us to 
generate false objectifications than truer or sensible ones, “not all 
reality is better understood the more objectively it is viewed.”4 For 
instance, the ideas of “thought” or “emotion” are not reducible to 
brain circuits or organ functions, the idea of love is not simply a 
“trick of nature” as what material reductionists may have supposed, 
that religiosity may be more profound than the usual dismissal of it 
as simply a psychological delusion—there are plenty of human 
attributes that cannot be reduced to functionalism or calculativity.  
Nagel’s answer to the crisis of subjectivity is quite different from 
that of existential phenomenology, although he raises his own 
objections to the reductionistic tendencies of the sciences. The 
                                                          
1Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 4.  
2See Robert Solomon, “Subjectivity,” The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).  
3Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 4. 
4Ibid.  
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important thing to realize is that the interplay of the two 
standpoints aforementioned is necessary and essential. 
 
A Critique of the Nihilism of the Age 
 
 The necessity of ethical practice will always constitute a 
problem in philosophy. The situation today is easily likened to that 
of Greek antiquity wherein Plato apparently called for ethical 
practice in order to prevent further moral and political degradation 
in the polis.5 We have come to realize, however, that the practice of 
ethics, Nagel is quick to say, must look up to objective values; they 
are necessary as conditions for its possibility, and it seems Nagel is 
more than willing to assert that reaching objectivity is the primary 
problem of ethics, it demands objectivity even more than science.6 
It has become a kind of capitulation to human weakness when we 
absolutize our most base, whimsical, often malevolent, capricious 
interests; ethics demands, then, that we strive for objectivity, that 
we step back from our initial perspective (which include subjective 
appearances) and form an impersonal perspective about the world. 
In other words, we must create room for “the possibility…for the 
recognition of values and reasons that are independent of one’s 
personal perspective and have force for anyone who can view the 
world impersonally, as a place that contains him.”7 But this does not 
mean that subjectivity did not play a rather transient role in 
constituting objective values: “when we detach from our individual 
perspective and the values and reasons that seem acceptable from 
within it, we can sometimes arrive at a new conception which may 
endorse some of the original reasons but will reject some as false 
appearances.”8 Even if we are eventually going to end up with a 
centerless view, we must acknowledge that its formative stages 
necessitated a deliberation of our subjective reasons and values. But 
insofar as we are generating an objective set of values, we must 
recognize their capacity as normative judgments, if they are to be 
sensible at all, so that a fine ethical question would not so much be 
about “what should I do?” but rather “how should anyone act 
                                                          
5Ethel M. Albert, Theodore Denise and Sheldon Peterfrund, Great 
Traditions in Ethics, Fifth Edition (Belmont, California: Wadsworth 
Publishing Co., 1984), 8.  
6Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 8, 138.  
7Ibid., 140.  
8Ibid.  
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under such-and-such circumstances?” Daniel Bonevac alludes to the 
example of the Chinese philosopher Mencius: for very real reasons, 
it is expected that any adult ought to be ready to rush to the rescue 
of a child who is about to fall into a well!9 
 This ethical objectivity, however, will not remain 
uncontested, especially with today’s moral climate, we have a 
Facebook generation where men and women are highly motivated 
by spectacular appearances, who will use the most squalid, shallow, 
or profane stuff of Hollywood movies (of course, there are a few 
exceptional films out there) as their only basis for truth, who have 
no regard at all for sound and level-headed research of what they 
ought to know and understand, many have lost the sentiment of 
becoming accountable to truth itself, many are more than willing to 
capitulate to their base consciousness and to be played for fools by 
political forces who master the populace—a lazy generation, if the 
likes of Nietzsche might characterize us. And so it appears most of 
us have ceased from hoping for any basis for objective values, an 
attitude that Nagel can only describe as a nihilistic form of thinking: 
 
But the claim that there are objective values is permanently 
controversial, because of the ease with which values and 
reasons seem to disappear when we transcend the subjective 
standpoint of our own desires. It can seem, when one looks 
at life from the outside, that there is no room for values in 
the world at all. So to say, “There are just people with 
various motives and inclinations…when we regard all this 
from the outside, all we see are psychological facts…[it 
would appear as if the] ascent to an objective view, far from 
revealing new values that modify the subjective appearances, 
reveals that appearances are all there is…Beyond that it 
applies here with a nihilistic result: nothing is objectively 
right or wrong because nothing objectively matters.10 
  
While such nihilistic position might be attractive for many, a 
number of seasoned philosophers have expressed their rejection of 
it. Nietzsche for one, despite the fact that he is branded as “nihilist” 
by mostly still untrained and haphazard scholars; a more rigorous 
understanding will show that Nietzsche, by claiming that “values 
                                                          
9Daniel Bonevac, Today’s Moral Issues: Classic and Contemporary 
Perspectives, Fifth Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 7.  
10Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 141.  
 
C O N F R O N T I N G  T H E  N I H I L I S M  O F  O U R  D A Y  
M A B I N I  R E V I E W  [ 1 2 ] V O L U M E  6  ( 2 0 1 7 )  
that are not transitory do not exist,” is not telling us to embrace 
nihilism, but is inviting us to become physicians of culture, to 
replace bad, anti-life sentiments with life affirming valuations.11 
Reading in context is everything. In The View From Nowhere, Thomas 
Nagel delivers yet another critique of nihilism, dismissing it outright 
as a lazily reductionistic view, likening it to physicalism in science,12 
it is a doctrine that tempts one to believe that appearances are all 
there is, since the physical world is all there is; We must naturally 
admit that there are occasions when physicalism turns into a form 
of myopia, one that pretends to capture the entire reality but simply 
is pretentiously sophisticated.  
As we have contemplated on earlier, there is something 
debilitating about pursuing a science that claims to be able to 
physicalize all sorts of phenomena, including human thought and 
mental states, as in admiring a painting, as if all these were 
explainable in terms of motions of matter, atoms--the laws of 
physics alone; here we end up not only with a dry but also an 
incomplete account of reality. That is also the reason why, explains 
Nagel, “current attempts to understand the mind by analogy with 
man-made computers that can perform superbly some of the 
external tasks as conscious beings will be recognized as a gigantic 
waste of time.”13 This simply is the result of passivity, of not being 
able to transcend the senses if one already needs to, or simply a lack 
or a laziness to exercise one’s powers of imagination. It also 
undermines the role of the subject in giving meaning to things. 
Furthermore, the nihilistic position for Nagel is a constant 
temptation to reoccupy a Humean position,14 this time scholars 
have applied Humean skepticism to ethics, in the attempt to justify 
the view that nothing can be objectively right or wrong. Hume 
originally claims that knowledge consists of nothing more than a 
succession of rather loose perceptions (ideas and impressions) that 
we associate with each other by sheer associative imagination (that 
is, without real objective basis) so that causality cannot really be 
explained in a meaningfully rigorous way.15 This, then, is the 
                                                          
11See Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1995), 116.  
12Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 141.   
13Ibid., 16.  
14Ibid., 141.  
15Reginald F. O’neill, Theories of Knowledge (New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, Inc., 1960), 189.  
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unimaginative approach to ethics by some: since all that what we 
have are loose appearances, there cannot be any right or wrong 
about them. Those who adhere to this view are content to provide a 
“naturalistic explanation” to values, analogous to a physicalist 
explanation of phenomena, which is also a “psychological 
explanation“ about how we might arbitrarily choose reasons for our 
actions and behavior. Nagel objects to this view: “What we see” 
when people take action with regard to how they ought to act, “is 
not just people being moved to act by their desires, but people 
acting and forming intentions and desires for reasons, good or 
bad.”16  He contends that if our choices about how we ought to act 
are to make sense as normative judgments at all, they must be 
driven by very real causes, not by arbitrary, fictional or fancied ones; 
and as the very agents that make choices, we are active agencies, not 
passive ones. To us the reasons behind our actions may be viewed 
as meaningful reasons, not tricks of nature or passive, even 
capitulating, automatized reactions to external stimuli, as some 
behaviorists might suppose they are. 
 
Objectivity in Ethics 
 
 We will find it useful here to probe a few more objections 
to ethical objectivity and to take a closer look at Nagel’s defense of 
such position as well as the notion that values are not illusions, that 
they are driven by real causes in real situations. 
 It seems the idea that what appear to be normative 
judgments are always arbitrary assumptions generated from a 
confused collection of mere appearances, and therefore cannot 
constitute anything objective, is a misleading one. To illustrate this 
point, Nagel invokes one of the suggestions presented in John 
Mackie’s Ethics. Nagel finds unacceptable the latter’s claim that 
values are “not part of the fabric of the world,” retorting instead 
that we can have objective reasons and values even with regard to 
the cognition and treatment of pain, or perhaps we can objectively 
say that anyone would have very real reasons, as opposed to 
“imagined” ones, to get rid of a certain form of pain, such as a 
headache. Nagel replies to Mackie, “The objective badness of 
pain…is not some mysterious property that all pains have, but just 
the fact that there is reason for anyone capable of viewing the world 
                                                          
16Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 142.  
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objectively that they want it to stop. The view that values are real is 
not the view that they are real occult properties, but that they are 
real values.”17 Even if one was to say that “my pain is entirely mine” 
and that “you cannot experience my pain,” nevertheless, the fact 
that we experience pain and that we have objective reasons to be rid 
of it is very real and not a fabrication of imagination. 
 Now, if we are willing to expand our notion of pain to 
cover not only immediate physical pain but also the “pains” that 
humanity experiences in the social sphere, we will see an even better 
explication of Nagel’s point. Anyone who is still in the right mind 
will definitely object to the notion that history consists of mere 
appearances so that even the great social evils committed against 
mankind are nothing more than illusions, explainable 
psychologically or metaphysically in terms of the negativity of being. 
Can we not actually derive real reasons for the valuing of human 
life, or valuing human dignity, or protection of human rights? The 
sensible answer seems to be that we actually can. Here we can 
probably hope for a higher degree of objectivity. It is impossible for 
anyone to deny the evil of the Islamic State,18 their threat of global 
terrorism, the possibility that another holocaust can occur (despite 
that many muddle-headed history teachers nowadays assert that the 
Nazi holocaust did not happen!), we do not need to see people 
actually being beheaded before coming to our senses and realizing 
that evil is real. The modern excess of eugenics by enforced 
sterilization, as it was driven by real evil causes, cannot be denied. 
The writer Ladelle McWhorter once stressed the importance of 
bringing out into the open the knowledges subjugated in history, 
such as the enforced sterilizations that were done in Virginia State 
in the 1920’s by the US government (this includes forcibly taking 
out the ovaries of “fickle-minded” women), carried out with the 
goal of ensuring that the part of the population responsible for 
bringing about “imbecile” or “fickle-minded” or “dumb” offspring 
                                                          
17Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 144.  
18The IS, Islamic State, formerly known as ISIS (Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria), designated as a terrorist organization by UN and 
composed mainly of Sunni Muslim jihadist fundamentalists. They are 
known for chopping people’s heads off and creating a public display of 
them. For more information, See Jim Muir, “Islamic State Group: The 
Full Story,” BBC News, 20 June 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-
east-35695648, accessed November 3, 2016. 
 
 
K .  A .  B O L A Ñ O S  
M A B I N I  R E V I E W  [ 1 5 ] V O L U M E  6  ( 2 0 1 7 )  
will not propagate.19 We cannot continue to be ensnared by the 
nihilism of our time, lest we all become armchair scholars, unable to 
act, and can do no other than just describe what is happening and 
explain away the human blunders of history in terms of, say, the 
metaphysics negativity of being, as if they were to be causes of 
celebration rather than embarrassment! Let us share this sentiment 
with Negri and Hardt: 
 
[T]he tragic philosophers of Europe…from Schopenhauer 
to Heidegger…turn these real destructions into metaphysical 
narratives about negativity of being, as if these actual 
tragedies were merely an illusion, or rather as if it were our 
ultimate destiny…from the killing fields of Verdun to the 
Nazi furnaces and the swift annihilation of thousands in 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the carpet bombing of Vietnam 
and Cambodia, the massacres in Setif and Sweto to Sabra 
and Shatila.20 
 
 There are even misguided scholars today who claim that the 
proposition “values are not real at all” is an objective one. Again 
such a proposition is unacceptable to Nagel. It can be demonstrated 
in this way: If we push ourselves towards our objective standpoint 
far enough, we are tempted to believe that we are detaching 
ourselves from all forms of personal values, or personal interests, so 
that we end up with an objective view that is free from all forms of 
value, “we discover that there is nothing—no values left of any kind: 
things are said to matter at all only to individuals within the world. 
The result is objective nihilism,”21 describes Nagel. Nagel 
acknowledges this temptation especially if one is to attempt at a 
centerless view, an objective conception of the world from 
nowhere. But Nagel insists that the centerless, objective view does 
not simply dismiss personal values and interests, “But the objective 
view has more to go on, for its data include the appearance of value 
to individuals with particular perspectives, including oneself.”22 We 
must bear in mind that in generating the objective view, we become 
                                                          
19See Ladelle McWhorter, Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo 
America: A Genealogy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).  
20Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Massachusets: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 46.  
21Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 146.  
22Ibid., 147.  
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active participants in it, it is our reasons that will constitute what 
will be acceptable later on in the objective framework, with all the 
necessary tests for objectivity involved. In other words, Nagel 
seems to suggest that the objective view was a product of much 
deliberation, and only rational agents deliberate about values. 
Objectivity does not even entail the complete dissolution of all 
personal values: “the problem is not that values seem to disappear 
but that there seem to be too many of them, coming from every life 
and drowning out those that arise from our own.”23 Nagel has 
already elucidated that these personal values arising originally from 
the subjective standpoint are subject to correction, confirmation, or 
even dismissal if they don’t seem to fit the objective view.24 And 
nothing will stop us from deliberating about values. 
 There is another argument raised against the objectivity of 
values, one which Nagel would refer to as the empirical argument: 
“if we consider the wide cultural variation in normative beliefs, the 
importance of social pressure and other psychological influences to 
their formation, and the difficulty of settling moral disagreements, it 
becomes highly implausible that they are anything but pure 
appearances.”25 Depending on the reader’s grasp of philosophical 
schools, one might see this position as closely associated with what 
many would term as moral relativism, as Bonevac explicitates: “let 
us say that an ethical relativist believes that fundamental ethical 
truth—the basic truth about how one should live and what one 
should do—is relative to a group smaller than humanity as a whole. 
Something may be fundamentally right for one group but 
fundamentally wrong for another.”26 Moral relativism has become 
highly popular in the academe so much so that Allan Bloom in The 
Closing of the American Mind wrote: “There is one thing a professor 
can be absolutely certain of: Almost every student entering the 
university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative.”27 The 
empirical argument earlier described by Nagel seems to be one of 
the direct logical implications of this relativist philosophy; it is easy 
to imagine how a relativist might suppose that the reasons for 
choosing a norm for action are simply trivial and arbitrary, hence, not 
                                                          
23Ibid.   
24Ibid., 4.  
25Ibid., 147.  
26Bonevac, Today’s Moral Issues: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives, 2.  
27Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1987). 25.  
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only can they not constitute objectivity but they may be deemed 
empty and unreal. Nagel clearly objects to this: “anyone offering 
[the empirical argument] must admit that not every psychological 
factor in the explanation of an appearance shows that the 
appearance corresponds to nothing real.”28 That there are variations 
in normative beliefs does entail that the prejudices embodied in 
them cannot be transcended, neither does it necessitate that the 
agents that hold these normative beliefs are simply passive minds: 
“the degree to which agreement can be achieved and social 
prejudices transcended in the face of strong pressures suggests that 
something real is being investigated…that there are certain reasons 
for action,”29 it is just that people often make a mistake of taking 
prejudiced, undeliberated “normative judgments” (which are 
disguised appearances)  to be the best accounts for reality when, in 
fact, they are not. But the fact that people can deliberate, set 
standards, agree and disagree is very telling of what rational agents 




 The nihilism of this age and time, the notion that “nothing 
ever matters objectively” is certainly debilitating and discouraging to 
say the least; proceeding in nihilistic fashion, we are unable to foster 
for ourselves the much-needed ethical accountability with regard to 
the reasons we hold behind our valuations. Perhaps the most 
important lesson in this paper is that we ought to disengage from 
such nihilistic frame of mind. In fact, ethics is quite the reverse of 
nihilism, it should be, from the outset, all about responsibility, or 
accountability with regard to our comings and goings, as even the 
ancients might have suggested with the term ascesis; such concept is 
applicable not only to religious life but to ethics in general, 
suggesting that one, borrowing a term from Michel Foucault, ought 
to put oneself in the activity of thought.30 But we are not simply 
passive scholars; such a nihilistic manner of proceeding is not 
something that we can continue consenting to, as it has been the 
                                                          
28Nagel, The View From Nowhere, 147.  
29Ibid., 148.  
30Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 2: The Use of 
Pleasure, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 9.  
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product of a confused, impulsive, irresponsible, often programmatic 
instruction. 
 Again as Nagel puts it, objectivity is the main course of 
ethics, and should be its main problematic, even in teaching ethics 
in contemporary education. We believe he has good reasons for the 
claim, and it is our hope in this paper that we are able to give justice 
to some of Thomas Nagel’s useful insights with regard to how we 
can be ethically objective about things or how normative judgments 
based on realistic reasons can be arrived at. We are, of course, made 
aware by Nagel of the difficulties involved in this pursuit for 
objectivity. It was admitted that there seems to be “no preset 
method of carrying out a normative investigation,”31 although there 
is hope for objectivity because the act of stepping back, which 
might involve what he terms as “integrating” the subjective with the 
objective, is not impossible—that itself should set certain 
conditions or parameters. Nagel continues, “the process…can go 
on indefinitely…some aspects of practical reason may prove to be 
irreducibly subjective, so that while their existence must be 
acknowledged from an objective standpoint their content cannot be 
understood except from a more particular perspective. But other 
reasons will irresistibly engage the objective will.”32 Again we stress 
that there is no guarantee for success, but such undertaking is 
worthwhile, if we have already made up our minds about not 
succumbing to the nihilistic mindset. 
In this paper, then, we highly commend Nagel for his 
contributions especially in the study of ethics, although it is 
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